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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
I 
JOHN HELLSTROM, dlb/a 1 
DIESEL SERVICE COMPANY, I 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
Case No. 
vs. \ 11462 
D. A. OSGUTHORPE, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
I 
Plaintiff and Respondent's Brief 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant's brief under "Disposition in Lower 
Court" states that the plaintiff's Motion for Summary · 
Judgment was granted by the Court "without even con-
sidering the Court file or the depositions." There is no 
support whatever for this bald assertion. The file shows 
that the Motion for Summary Judgment was opposed 
by appellant's affadivit, that the matter was fully 
1 
argued on November 15, depositions introduced, that a 
proposed Summary Judgment was served on November 
18 and signed by the Court on November 20. This is 
all recited in the summary judgment ( R-33) and appe). 
lant cites no support for his charge. 
Appellant's Statement of Facts, Page 2, states that 
when Clarence Osguthorpe picked up the truck he signed 
"a blank repair order form." The affidavit of Clarence 
Osguthorpe ( R-30) identifies the document attached 
to plaintiff's reply as being the document he signed but 
states that only the amounts were not on the document 
at that time. 
Appellant's brief states that defendant "objected" 
to the cost of repairs. His deposition (Page 12) states 
that the plaintiff "explained why it had run more money 
than what he had said" and does not contain any word 
of objection or dissatisfaction. 
Appellant's brief then states that after the volun· 
tary repairs made by plaintiff in June, 1967, the truck 
"still did not perform satisfactorily" but there is no 
statement by either Clarence Osguthorpe or the defend-
ant that this was ever reported to the plaintiff and the 
plaintiff testified that no complaint was made to him 
subsequent to the work done in June, 1967 (Hellstrom 
deposition, Page 30). 
Plaintiff's Statement of Facts then states that "at 
no time did the parties agree on any settled amount for 
the work" which is the basis of respondent's claim that 
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as a matter of law there was an agreement through the 
furnishing of the full statement and the payment on 
account which is not denied. 
Appellant's brief (Page 3) then states that defend-
ant denied the authority of Clarence Osguthorpe to 
bind him on a contract providing for attorney's fees 
and interest. Defendant at no time denied the authority 
of Clarence Osguthorpe, and indeed intimated that he 
was probably an owner of the business when he said 
in his deposition (Page 21) that "'Ve always go by 
Osguthorpe Brothers" and stated only that he was "not 
willing to be bound by" a document which was not 
filled in. ( Osguthorpe deposition, Page 15). Clarence 
Osguthorpe appears to have an ownership interest from 
the language of his affidavit. (R-31). 
At the top of Page 4 appellant points out that the 
Clarence Osguthorpe deposition "had not been filed 
in the Court and is not even a part of the record on 
appeal." The affidavit of Clarence Osguthorpe is a 
part of the record (R-20 to 31), having been filed on 
the day of the argument of the Motion for Summary 
Judgment, apparently in lieu of the deposition. Counsel 
for defendant stated that he did not have the deposition 
of Clarence Osguthorpe filed "and that is why I am 
introducing this affidavit at this time." (R-56). Counsel 
for plaintiff then stated that he had copies and could 
supply one and Mr. Burton stated that there were not 
any corrections and chose to rest on the affidavit rather 
than produce the deposition and when counsel for plain-
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tiff stated that the affidavit agrees with the deposition 
the defendant made no further comment. (R-57). 
At Page 8 appellant argues that information as 
to the plaintiff's markup on parts and outside work was 
not before the Court (Appellant's brief, Page 8). That 
is, of course, because appellant wrote his brief without 
reading a transcript of the proceedings on November 15, 
1967 from which it plainly appears that this information 
was elicited and was before the Court. ( R-50 to 55). 
And at Pages 10 and 11 of his brief appellant 
argues that there was nothing before the Court on the 
matter of attorney's fees. This matter was also covered 
and appears in the supplemental transcript. (R-55 to 
57). 
POINTS O:F ARGUMENT 
I. Is this a case for summary judgment? 
2. Is the price of the work established? 
A. On the theory of account stated? 
B. As being reasonable? 
3. Is plaintiff entitled to attorney's fees? 
A. Is the agreement sufficient? 
B. Is the proof sufficient? 
4. Was interest properly allowed? 
4 
ARGUMENT 
1. Is this a case for summary judgment? 
Appellant argues that summary judgment should 
not be granted to prevent a party from presenting his 
evidence except when it appears that there is no genu-
ine issue of material fact (Brief, Pages 17 and 19). We 
agree. It should be observed here that depositions of the 
parties were taken as well as the deposition of Clarence 
Osguthorpe and in lieu of producing his deposition 
defendant filed an affidavit as to the participation of 
Clarence Osguthorpe in the transaction. Nowhere does 
the defendant point out any evidence or type of evidence 
which he desires to present more fully than was covered 
in the deposition or the affidavit. 
In other words, it appears that by the use of depo-
sitions and affidavits both parties were able to present 
their evidence without a trial. Is there a genuine issue 
as to a material fact? 
Respondent recognizes that the rule is that on a 
motion for summary judgment the evidence will be 
viewed by the reviewing court most favorably to the 
loser. Thompson vs. Ford Motor Company, 16 Utah 
2d 30, 395 P 2d 62. The basic consideration still is · 
whether there is a genuine issue of fact. Larsen vs. 
Christensen, 21 U 2d 219, 443 P 2d 402. The mere 
assertion that a fact issue exists does not preclude the 
granting of summary judgment. Foster vs. Steed, 19 
U 2d 435, 432 P 2d 60; Leininger vs. Stearns-Roger 
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Manufacturing Company, 17 U 2d 37, 404 P 2d 33. 
Furthermore, the unresolved issue of fact must be an 
issue which must be resolved by the Court to determine 
the legal rights of the parties. FMA Finanical Corpo, 
ration vs. Build, Inc., 17 U 2d 80, 404 P 2d 670. 
In his brief the appellant contends there are issues 
of fact on the following matters: 
( 1) There was an agreement between the parties 
for repairs at a specified price. (Page 6) 
( 2) The work was to be done at reasonable costs 
with an estimate by respondent. (Page 8} 
(3) When was the account past due? (Page 9) 
( 4) There is a dispute as to reasonable attorney's 
fees. (Page 10) 
( 5) There is no agreemnt as to the amount due 
and owing. (Page 12) 
( 6) Defendant contends he has not accepted the 
work. (Page 13) 
(7) Did Clarence Osguthorpe have authority to 
sign the repair bill? (Page 14) 
(I) There was no agreement between the parties 
for repairs at a specified price. 
Defendant in his deposition gave as the figures of 
the estimate $1,800 to $1,900 initially and then increased 
that by $400 to $500 with a statement attributable to 
plaintiff that "I'm sure I can repair it for this amount" 
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and the defendant's response, "We don't want to spend 
any more money than this." ( Osguthorpe Deposition, 
Page 11). This still is an estimate and not a contract 
and the total of $2,500 is within a reasonable range 
of the final figure on the billing of $2,784.57. 
( 2) The work was to be done at reasonable costs 
with an e5timate by respondent. 
This is a corollary of the first statement and is 
stated separately by appellant (Pages 6 and 7). The 
respondent testified as to the number of hours spent 
on the truck and that he scaled that down as he usually 
does (Hellstrom Deposition, Pages 22 & 32-33) and 
that his mark-up on parts and outside work was the 
standard practice in the industry. (R-51 & 54). 
Whether the charges made were reasonable is an 
issue raised by the allegation in the Complaint that the 
work was to be at the ''reasonable and agreed price of 
$2,784.57" which was put in issue by the answer. But 
as the evidence developed, it was that the original 
invoice or statement was delivered to Clarence and 
then to the defendant ( Osguthorpe Deposition, Page 
13) and after the June repairs a further statement was 
delivered to the defendant ( Osguthorpe Depositi_on, 
Page 16-17) and that thereafter a payment of $500.00 · 
was made ( Osguthorpe Deposition, Page 17) which 
amounted, in the contemplation of law, to an agreed 
balance of the nature of an account stated. 
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(3) When was the account pa~t due? 
Appellant's own authority at Page 9 is that tl 
account was due immediately, in the absence of a1 
other circumstances. There were no other circumstanc1 
here and respondent gave appellant the benefit of U 
doubt by considering the account due following the corr 
pletion of repairs to make the job satisfactory an 
accepted, there having been no further complaints. Fr 
convenience respondent used the 10th of the followin. 
month as the due date with the statement "No lah 
than July 10, 1967". Appellant points to no fact whic 
raises an issue as to this. 
( 4) There is a dispute as to reasonable attorney 
fee. 
Appellant did not have the supplemental tran 
script before him and the stipulation of counsel seem 
to cover the necessity of proof on this point under tli 
authority cited by appellant on Page 11 of his briel 
( 5) There is no agreement as to the amount dn, 
and owing. 
This is raised by appellant at Page 12 of his brie: 
and is actually answered under points (I) and (2 
considered here. The law is argued under point 2. 
( 6) Defendant contends he has not accepted t!1 
work. 
Plaintiff testified that following the repairs ir 
June he had no complaint as to the truck and the dt 
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fendant acknowledged this and attempted to justify 
his failure to make complaint by saying he was not 
satisfied with the treatment he had received (Hellstrom 
Deposition, Page 30, Osguthorpe Deposition, Page 
18). The fact remains uncontroverted that the work 
was accepted and no further complaint was made. 
( 7) Did Clarence Osguthorpe have authority to 
sign the repair bill? 
Clarence Osguthorpe delivered the truck to the 
plaintiff and this was known to the defendant. ( Osgu-
thorpe Deposition, Pages 9 & 13). Proper delivery of 
the car was made to the person who had brought it in 
with authority confirmed by defendant's conversations 
with the plaintiff. 
Defendant received the original bill with the sig-
nature of his brother on it and the agreement to pay 
attorney's fees. (Osguthorpe Deposition, Pages 13, 15, 
16) and then received a similar bill with the June repairs 
on it and the final balance ( Osguthorpe Deposition, 
Pages 16, 17) . His only explanation was that he did 
not read the agreement. (Deposition, Page 16). De-
fendant was charged with knowledge of the agreement 
and at no time denied the authority of his brother. 
2. Is the price of the work established? 
A. On the theory of account stated? 
Appellant challenges use of the phrase "account 
stated" on Pages 12 and 13 of his brief. Respondent 
9 
took the position in the Motion for Summary Judgment 
that the balance here is established as being in the nature 
of an account stated. It is true that there was riot a 
large number of transactions, but there were two trans-
actions, the main repair job in J auuary and .February, 
1967 and the additional repairs in June, 1967, followed 
by the rendering of a com1Jlete bill following which and 
in October 1967 there was a payment on the account 
of $500.00. ( Osguthorpe Deposition, Pages 13, 15 and 
17). 
Following the quotation made by appellant at Page 
12 of his Brief from Section 21 of 1 Am J ur 2d on 
Accounts and Accounting appears this: 
"It is now the accepted rule that an account 
stated may be based upon a single item, or upon 
an account in ·which all the items are on one side. 
To effect an account stated the outcome of the 
negotiations must be the recognition of a balance 
due from one of the parties to the other with a 
promise, expressed or implied, to pay that bal-,. 
ance. 
and at Section 24 it is stated: 
"If the statement is in writing, it need not Le 
signed; it is sufficient if it has been examine~ 
and accepted by both parties, and acceptance o~ 
the account may be implied from circumstances. 
and at Section 28: 
"An account stated predisposes an absolute 
acknowledgmell or admission of a eertain sum 
due, or an adjustment of aceounts between the 
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parties, the striking of a balance, and an assent 
to the correctness of the balance, which assent 
assent may be either expressed or implied." 
and a partial payment has been regarded as an implied 
assent or promise to pay the balance. 
The seller of the service, having rendered a com-
plete statement, the assent of the defendant is to be 
found both in retaining the statement without com-
plaint, and in his having made a payment on account. 
Harris vs. Merlino, 137 N.J. 717, 61 A 2d 276 at 279; 
l Am J ur 2d, Accounts and Accounting, Section 24; 
Restatement of Contracts, Section 422 ( 1) ; Williston 
on Contracts Revised Edition, Section 90 B. 
The Motion for Summary Judgment states that 
there is no substantial issue as follows: "8. After ren-
dition of the bill to the defendant in the amount of 
$2,784.57 and after the charges of $6.75 in June the 
defendant on October 6, 1967 paid $500.00 on the 
account leaving a balance of $2,291.32." (R-27) 
The defendant in his deposition stated that after 
the work was done he received the bill and discussed the 
amount of it with the plaintiff. There was no statement 
that the bill was disputed or challenged in any way 
and the only further comment was that the truck was 
not operating satisfactorily, which was subsequently 
remedied. ( Osguthorpe Deposition, Pages 13 to 14). 
B. As being reasonable? 
Plaintiff didn't make any point of the reasonable-
ness of the charges, since the rendering of the account 
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and the acknowledgment of its correctness by the pay-
ment was the essence of his case. Hut in the deposition 
of the defendant Mr. Osguthorpe stated that he was 
not an authority "on the price of truck parts" or as 
to charges for labor. ( Osguthorpe Deposition, Page 
18). 
In the deposition taken of the plaintiff in response 
to questions asked by the defendant plaintiff testified 
that has labor charges were his standard charges (Page 
22), that he charged "the going rate at that itme" (Page 
22), that the total hours were 112 and that these were 
adjusted to 98 (Pages 32 and 33) , and when he was 
compelled to answer questions as to mark-ups on parts 
and on outside work the plaintiff testified that he used 
standard and competitive mark-ups (R-51, Lines 24 
to 26, R-54, Lines 13 to 16). 
And again, the payment of a part of a completed 
statement forecloses the issue as to amount due, in the 
absence of fraud which is not even hinted at in the plead-
ings or the depositions. 
3. Is plaintiff entitled to attorney's fees? 
A. ls the agreement sufficient? 
The signed statement is that "purchaser agrees 
to pay attorney fees, legal fees and all expenses involYed 
in the event legal action is necessary for the collection 
of the repair order." ( R-10) . The reference to it as a 
repair order and not as a finalized bill on the face of 
the document establishes a definite contract. 
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Defendant questions the authority for the signature 
in his brief. (Pages 14-15). In his deposition the de-
fendant's only question was wether he should be bound 
when a blank invoice is signed, although he was wrong 
about this being a blank invoice. ( Osguthorpe Depo-
sition, Pages 15-16; Clarence Osguthorpe Affidavit, 
R29). An agent my bind his principal in a matter 
incident to his recognized authority. Blashfield, Ency-
clopedia of Automobile Law and Practice, Section 5034. 
The person delivering the car has apparent authority 
to bind the principal as to terms of repair. Blashfield, 
Section 5104; Cotton vs. Garrell, 180 Mo. App. l18, 
167 S"\V l187, Corpus Juris Secundum, Agency, Sec-
tion 102. 
Defendant, having received the repairs and the 
bill, without objection to the agent's authority, has 
ratified it, on principle of estoppel. C.J.S. Agency, 
Section 29, Page 1063; 1'hompson vs. Collier-Reynolds, 
155 Ark. 355, 244 S"\V 355; Dell Wood Tires vs. Miss, 
(Mo. App.) 198 S'i\T 2nd 347, 353. 
B. ls the proof sufficient? 
At Pages 10 and 11 of his brief appellant attacks 
the allowance of attorney fees and suggests that the 
plaintiff offered no proof. At the hearing on November 
15 the invoice which was Exhibit 1 was introduced in 
evidence and the Court said: "If Mr. Bird were called 
to testify would you agree $500.00 is a reasonable fee? 
I think that is what he is asking for, isn't it?" 
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Mr. Burton: "I think that is not in dispute." 
Mr. Bird: "I calculated this at $597.00." (R-55) 
Mr. Burton then went on to the matter of the Clarence 
Osguthorpe affidavit and the Court then said: "Let's 
get back to the attorney fee. \Vould you agree, if ht 
testified, that there would be a reasonable fee?" 
Mr. Burton: "I would." (R-56, Lines 26 to 29) 
These stipulations were overlooked by the appe]. 
lant in his brief. 
4. WM interest properly allowed? 
Thi~ raises questions as to the amount of interest 
and the time when it started. The complaint asked for 
1 
interest from February 10, 1967 ( R-2) and at the 1 
maximum legal rate as provided by the contract (R-10). 
Appellant's own authority on Page 9 of his brief 
states that "in the absence of any circumstances indi· 
eating a different intention an account is payable im· 
mediately." The agreement here provided for interest 
at maximum legal rate on all past due accounts (R-10). 
Respondent, desiring to eliminate matters on which 
there was a substantial issue, waived interest from Feb· 
ruary through June for the reason that additional repair 
work was done on the truck in June 1967. Rather than 1 
commence interest immediately, interest was calculated 
from the 10th of the following month, which it is sub· 
mitted is a reasonable date for payment and commence· 
ment of interest, there being no evidence of any com· 
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munication to the plaintiff of the failure of the truck 
to work satisfactorily in every way after the additional 
work was done in June 1967 (Hellstrom Deposition, 
Page 30). 
There is no genuine issue as to due date of the 
repair bill when work was completed February 27, 1967. 
No complaint was made until plaintiff was called about 
payment of the bill (Hellstrom Dep. P. 13). Every 
question as to due date has been resolved to benefit 
appellant. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant points out no areas of genuine issue of 
substantial fact. Appellant's unsupported statement 
that there are issues for a jury trial does not raise a 
"genuine issue." 
The balance owing was fixed, the appellant as-
sented to it by acquiescence and partial payment. There 
is no basis for challenge of the authority of Clarence 
Osguthorpe from any statement in the affidavit or 
deposition. The payment ratified the authority and the 
terms. The attorneys fees were resolved pursuant to 
stipulation. The judgment should be confirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Richard L. Bird, Jr. 
for Richards and 'Vatkins 
Attorneys for plaintiff-respondent 
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